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I.

INTRODUCTION
On October 8, 2020, the FBI announced that it

had arrested thirteen men who plotted to kidnap the
Governor of Michigan, Gretchen Whitmer, at her
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vacation home on Mackinac Island.2 After the planned
kidnapping, she was to be subjected to a trial for her
supposedly tyrannical actions amid the COVID-19
pandemic.3 In preparation, the group held meetings,
conducted surveillance, and discussed how they could
manufacture the weapons necessary to accomplish their
plan.4 The group had even constructed a fake house out
of PVC tubing to practice pushing inside buildings and
clearing rooms.5 In addition, one member of the group
purchased an 800,000-volt taser which he planned to
use to subdue the Governor.6 Two other group members

See Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Shaila Dewan & Kathleen Gray,
F.B.I. Says Michigan Anti-Government Group Plotted to Kidnap
Gov. Gretchen Whitmer, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 12, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/08/us/gretchen-whitmermichigan-militia.html.
3 Id.
4 See Ken Bensinger & Jessica Garrison, Watching the Watchmen,
BUZZFEED NEWS (July 20, 2021, 8:36 AM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/kenbensinger/michigankidnapping-gretchen-whitmer-fbi-informant.
5 Id.
6 See Paul Egan & Tresa Baldas, 'Deeply Disturbing': Feds Charge
Extremists in Domestic Terror Plot to Kidnap Michigan Gov.
Gretchen Whitmer, Create Civil War, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Oct. 8,
2020, 8:49 PM),
https://www.freep.com/story/news/nation/2020/10/08/militiamembers-charged-plot-against-michigan-gov-gretchenwhitmer/5923650002/.
2
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even purchased explosives and detonated an improvised
explosive device containing shrapnel to test its
effectiveness against human targets. 7
Following the arrests, many responded harshly
to the plot to kidnap Governor Whitmer. 8 Mike Shirkey,
the Michigan State Senate’s Majority Leader, stated, “A
threat against our Governor is a threat against us all.
We condemn those who plotted against her and our
government. They are not patriots. There is no honor in
their actions. They are criminals and traitors, and they
should be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.” 9
Representative

Elissa

Congressional

District

Slotkin

of

claimed

Michigan’s
that

the

8th
plot

See Sonia Moghe & Devan Cole, 3 Men Charged in Plot to
Kidnap Michigan Governor Now Face Weapon of Mass
Destruction Charge, CNN (Apr. 29, 2021, 8:27 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/28/politics/gretchen-whitmerkidnap-plot-charges/index.html.
8 See Christina Carrega, Veronica Stracqualursi & Josh
Campbell, 13 Charged in Plot to Kidnap Michigan Gov. Gretchen
Whitmer, CNN (Oct. 8, 2020, 10:32 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/08/politics/fbi-plot-michigangovernor-gretchen-whitmer/index.html.
9 Mike Shirkey (@SenMikeShirkey), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2020, 12:27
PM),
https://twitter.com/SenMikeShirkey/status/1314241108365455360
?s=20.
7
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represented the growing threat of domestic terror in the
United States and called for federal leaders to respond
accordingly.10

Perhaps

most

significantly,

Representative Slotkin stated, “I’m so thankful to
federal, state, and local law enforcement for taking the
threat seriously and getting to the perpetrators before
they could act.”11 However, unbeknownst to State
Senator Shirkey and Representative Slotkin, the fast
response of law enforcement mainly resulted from their
extensive use of informants who led much of the plot at
the direction of federal investigators.12
In investigating the plot to kidnap Governor
Whitmer, the government utilized at least twelve
informants.13 One informant from Wisconsin helped
organize the group’s meetings and even provided
conspirators with hotel rooms to encourage their

Elissa Slotkin (@RepSlotkin), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2020, 3:04 PM),
https://twitter.com/RepSlotkin/status/1314280632923705348.
11 Elissa Slotkin (@RepSlotkin), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2020, 3:04 PM),
https://twitter.com/RepSlotkin/status/1314280629492748294?s=2
0.
12 See Bensinger & Garrison, supra note 4.
13 Id.
10
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attendance.14 Another informant, Dan, an Iraq War
veteran, was so deeply enmeshed with the group that
he became the group’s second-in-command.15 Dan
encouraged members of the plot to collaborate with
other potential suspects, provided the group with
firearms training, and even went as far as pressuring
the group’s leader to advance the kidnapping plot. 16
Dan was also provided with $54,793.95, a new phone,
a new computer, and a new car in exchange for acting
as an informant for a mere seven months.17 As a result
of the extensive government involvement in the plot,
one of the defendants accused the government of
entrapment.18 Other defendants have stated that they
plan to make similar claims when their cases go to
trial.19
This paper suggests that the federal government
frequently
Id.
Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
14
15

utilizes

such

tactics

in

terrorism
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investigations

and

that

the

subjective

test

for

entrapment utilized in federal courts is partially to
blame. Part II of this paper will examine the history of
federal terrorism investigations and entrapment as a
defense in federal courts. Part III of this paper explores
the case of James Cromitie, a particularly infamous
terrorism prosecution. Finally, part IV will argue that
to dissuade the federal government from utilizing such
questionable tactics in terrorism investigations, the
federal legislature should replace the subjective test for
entrapment with the objective test as codified in the
Model Penal Code.
II.

THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL TERRORISM
INVESTIGATIONS AND THE ENTRAPMENT
DEFENSE
A.

CHANGES TO FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
FOLLOWING 9/11
On September 11, 2001, a terrorist attack

on the World Trade Center in New York City killed
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nearly 3,000 Americans and injured many more. 20 This
attack changed American society forever and had an
overwhelmingly transformative effect on federal law
enforcement.21 Terrorism investigations went from
being a relatively fringe law enforcement specialization
to the number one priority of the entire federal
government.22 Following 9/11, federal funding rapidly
shifted towards terrorism investigations.23 Congress
even created an entirely new executive department to
combat terrorism by passing the Homeland Security
Act.24

See September 11 Terror Attacks Fast Facts, CNN (Sept. 3,
2021, 10:40 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september11-anniversary-fast-facts/.
21 See The Global Impact of 9/11, POLICE CHIEF MAGAZINE,
https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/the-global-impact-of-9-11/
(last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
22 See Douglas A. Brook & Cynthia L. King, Civil Service Reform
as National Security: The Homeland Security Act of 2002, 67 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 399, 399 (2007).
23 See Eric Lichtblau, David Johnston & Ron Nixon, F.B.I.
Struggles to Handle Financial Fraud Cases, THE NEW YORK
TIMES (Oct. 18, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/19/washington/19fbi.html.
24 See Stuart Anderson, Why Was The Homeland Security
Department Created?, FORBES (Apr. 12, 2019,12:13 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2019/04/12/why-wasthe-homeland-security-department-created/?sh=369d9fcdad4b.
20
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The FBI absorbed much of the blame for allowing
the 9/11 terror attacks to happen.25 Due to a
communication failure, the FBI failed to track many of
the 9/11 conspirators living in the United States.26
Additionally, intelligence officials estimated

that

anywhere from 2,000 to 5,000 agents of Al-Qaeda were
hiding and operating within the United States.27 In
response, the FBI shifted large numbers of personnel
from

organized

crime

and

white-collar

crime

investigations to terrorism investigations. 28 Further,
federal agents felt pressured to open more and more
terrorism investigations.29 Former FBI agent Michael
German describes the dramatic shift as follows,

See Jesse J. Norris & Hanna Grol-Prokopczyk, Estimating the
Prevalence of Entrapment in Post-9/11 Terrorism Cases, 105 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 609, 617 (2015).
26 See Elaine Kamarck, 9/11 and the Reinvention of the US
Intelligence Community, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Aug. 27,
2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2021/08/27/9-11and-the-reinvention-of-the-u-s-intelligence-community/.
27 See Janet Reitman, ‘I Helped Destroy People’,,’ THE NEW YORK
TIMES (Sept. 9, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/01/magazine/fbi-terrorismterry-albury.html.
28 See Lichtblaum et al., supra note 23.
29 See Reitman, supra note 27.
25
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Prior to September 11, 2001, if an agent
had suggested opening a terrorism case against
someone who was not a member of a terrorist
group, who had not attempted to acquire
weapons, and who didn’t have the means to
obtain them, he would have been gently
encouraged to look for a more serious threat. An
agent who suggested giving such a person a
stinger missile or a car full of military-grade
plastic explosives would have been sent to
counseling. Yet […] such techniques [have
become] commonplace.30
In the years following 9/11, the government’s

terrorism-related fears have largely proved to have
been unfounded.31 Further investigation revealed that
the supposed thousands of Al-Qaeda operatives in the
United States did not exist.32 In fact, there has also only
been one case of a foreign terrorist organization
directing or coordinating a deadly attack inside the
United States since 9/11.33 One study of the nearly 580

See Michael German, Manufacturing Terrorists: How FBI Sting
Operations Make Jihadists out of Hapless Malcontents, REASON,
https://reason.com/2013/03/15/manufacturing-terrorists/ (last
visited Oct. 7, 2021).
31 See Reitman, supra note 27.
32 Id.
33 See Peter Bergen & David Sterman, What is the Threat to the
United States Today?, NEW AMERICA (Sept. 10, 2021),
https://www.newamerica.org/internationalsecurity/reports/terrorism-in-america/what-is-the-threat-to-theunited-states-today.
30
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terrorism cases since 9/11 estimated that only around
9% of terrorism defendants represented a genuine
terror threat.34
B.

THE EXTENT OF ENTRAPMENT TACTICS IN
FEDERAL INVESTIGATIONS
Following the changes to federal terrorism

investigations following 9/11, many critics have alleged
that the government merely manufactures terrorists
through entrapment.35 Cases reveal that during
terrorism investigations, government actors have
badgered suspects into committing terror attacks,
offered suspects financial incentives to commit terror
attacks, and even threatened to kill the suspect if they
do not commit a terror attack.36 It is also not uncommon
See Norris & Grol-Prokopczyk, supra note 25, at 662-63
(explaining the researchers’ opinion that only 31 of the jihadi
defendants examined by the researchers seemed likely to actually
carry out a terror attack based on factors such as the defendant
having made concrete plans for an attack or having already
acquired weapons prior to contact with the government).
35 See generally, German, supra note 30.
36 See, e.g., United States v. Cromitie, 781 F. Supp. 2d 211, 217-20
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (describing how informant repeatedly encouraged
defendant to participate in terror plot and offered money in
exchange for participation); United States v. Shareef, No. 10 C
7860, 2011 WL 4888877, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 2011) (describing
the informant's threats to kill the defendant).
34
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in terrorism investigations for government actors to
have substantial involvement in the formulation of such
terror plots by suggesting targets or plans for an attack
or even providing suspects with the means of carrying
out said attack.37
Professors Jesse J. Norris and Hanna GrolProkopczyk evaluated the extent of the problem in their
journal article titled “Estimating the Prevalence of
Entrapment in Post-9/11 Terrorism Cases.”38 In their
article, the professors identified six core indicators of
entrapment: (1) the defendant’s lack of previous
terrorism offenses, (2) the plan having been proposed by
the government, (3) the existence of informant pressure
or persuasion, (4) a material incentive for participating
in the plot, (5) reluctance by the defendant, and (6) a
high level of government control over the criminal
activity.39

Of

these

entrapment

indicators,

See Norris & Grol-Prokopczyk, supra note 25, at 618, 628.
Id. at 610.
39 Id. at 628-34.
37
38

the
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defendant’s lack of previous terrorism offenses, a
government proposed plan, and a high level of
government control over the criminal activity were
present most frequently. 40 Of the more than 500 cases
analyzed by the professors, three or more of the core
indicators were present 50% of the time.41
C.

THE FEDERAL FORMULATION OF THE

ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
Many of the issues surrounding the tactics
utilized by federal law enforcement exist partly due to
the federal formulation of the entrapment doctrine. To
more accurately describe the problems with the federal
entrapment defense and its relationship to government
tactics in federal terrorism investigations, we must first
discuss federal jurisprudence regarding entrapment.
1.

40
41

Id. at 656.
Id.

WOO WAI V. UNITED STATES
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Entrapment first emerged as a defense in federal

courts in the Ninth Circuit case of Woo Wai v. United
States.42 Woo Wai v. United States involved a defendant
who was asked by undercover immigration agents to
illegally transport Chinese immigrants across the
Mexican border into the United States. 43 The defendant
initially declined the agents’ offer but gave in after
several months of repeated persuasion.44 The defendant
was subsequently indicted and convicted for his role in
the conspiracy.45 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed
the conviction and recognized entrapment as an
affirmative defense stating that “it is against public
policy to sustain a conviction obtained in the manner
which is disclosed by the evidence in this case […] a
sound public policy can be upheld only by denying the

See, Stephen A. Gardbaum, “The Government Made Me Do It”:
A Proposed Approach to Entrapment Under Jacobson v. United
States, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 995, 997 (1994).
43 See Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412, 413 (9th Cir. 1915).
44 Id. at 413-14.
45 Id. at 412.
42
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criminality of those who are thus induced to commit
[criminal] acts[.]” 46
2.

SORRELLS V. UNITED STATES

Seventeen years later, the Supreme Court
followed the Ninth Circuit’s recognition of entrapment
as a defense in Sorrells v. United States.47 Sorrells
involved a case in which the lower court convicted the
defendant of possessing and selling one-half gallon of
whiskey in violation of the National Prohibition Act
only after the repeated requests of an undercover
prohibition

agent.48

The

Court

recognized

the

affirmative defense of entrapment on the basis that a
defendant should not be held criminally liable when
their “criminal design originates with the officials of the
Government.”49 However, the majority, led by Justice
Hughes, held that the Court’s ability to recognize

Id. at 415.
See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932).
48 Id. at 439-40.
49 Id. at 442.
46
47
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entrapment as a defense was only a result of the Court’s
ability to interpret statutes to prevent absurd results.50
Engaging in a

protracted exercise of

statutory

construction, the majority concluded that Congress did
not intend for criminal statutes to apply to those who
had no predisposition to commit the crime but were
induced to do so by government officials. 51 Therefore,
under the majority’s test, one can only rely on the
entrapment defense when they had no predisposition to
commit the crime prior to government inducement. 52
This entrapment formulation has since become known
as the subjective test.53
Concurring in the result and joined by Justices
Brandeis and Stone, Justice Roberts took issue with the
majority’s formation of entrapment as a defense.54 In
Justice Roberts’s opinion, rather than resting on a
strained construction of statutory law, creating the

Id. at 446.
Id. at 448-50.
52 Id. at 451.
53 See Gardbaum, supra note 42, at 999.
54 See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring).
50
51
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entrapment defense was a matter of public policy.55
Additionally, Justice Roberts believed that the judge
should resolve the issue of entrapment rather than the
jury.56 Justice Roberts opined that “[i]t is the province
of the court and the court alone to protect itself and the
government from such prostitution of the criminal
law.”57 Justice Roberts also believed that the defense of
entrapment should focus on the conduct of the
investigating

officers

rather

than

the

innocent

predisposition of the defendant. 58 To do otherwise
would

create

trials which turned

“not

on the

commission of the crime charged, but on the prior
reputation or some former act or acts of the defendant
not mentioned in the indictment.”59 This entrapment
formulation has since become known as the objective
test.60

Id. (Roberts, J., concurring).
Id. (Roberts, J., concurring).
57 Id. (Roberts, J., concurring).
58 Id. at 458 (Roberts, J., concurring).
59 Id. at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring).
60 See Gardbaum, supra note 42, at 999.
55
56
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3.

SHERMAN V. UNITED STATES

The Supreme Court revisited the issue of
entrapment in Sherman v. United States.61 In Sherman,
the majority reaffirmed the subjective test created by
the majority in Sorrells.62 Further, it reiterated the
essential nature of the defendant’s prior innocent
disposition in establishing entrapment as a defense,
stating, “a line must be drawn between the trap for the
unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary
criminal.”63 The majority refused to refashion the
entrapment defense as suggested by the Sorrells
concurrence on the basis that neither of the parties
raised the issue.64 Nevertheless, despite refusing to
reformulate the entrapment defense on procedural
grounds, the majority opined that Roberts’s formulation
was unworkable because not allowing litigation on the
issue of the defendant’s predisposition would place the

See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 370 (1958).
Id. at 372.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 376.
61
62
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prosecution at an impermissible disadvantage.65 In
support of their refusal to reformulate entrapment as a
defense, the majority also cited many circuit court
opinions which rejected Justice Roberts’s proposition
that a judge alone should decide the issue of
entrapment.66
Concurring only in the result of Sherman, Justice
Frankfurter disagreed with the majority’s refusal to
reexamine the federal entrapment standard stating,
“[i]n a matter of this kind, the Court should not rest on
the first attempt at an explanation for what sound
instinct counsels.” 67 Frankfurter rebuked the “sheer
fiction” that recognition of the entrapment defense was
based on a defendant’s conduct being outside the scope
of the statute and insisted that the defense was instead
premised on a recognition that a conviction obtained
through the morally dubious actions of government

Id. at 376-77.
Id. at 377.
67 Id. at 379.
65
66
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actors could not be sustained.68 Frankfurter also
reiterated Roberts’s concern that allowing evidence of a
defendant’s reputation, criminal activities, and prior
disposition lead to undue prejudice against the
defendant.69 As a result, Frankfurter argued, a
defendant in an entrapment case is forced to choose
between the lesser of two evils and either forgo the
defense of entrapment or run the risk that they may
face persecution for activities other than those alleged
to

be

criminal.70

entrapment

In

defense

Frankfurter’s
should

shift

opinion,
away

the
from

consideration of a defendant’s subjective record and
predisposition and towards “the conduct of the police
and the likelihood, objectively considered, that it would
entrap only those ready and willing to commit crime.”71
Frankfurter

also

agreed

with

Justice

Roberts’s

contention that the determination of entrapment is

Id. at 379-80.
Id. at 382.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
68
69
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more appropriately vested in a judge rather than a
jury.72
4.

UNITED STATES V. RUSSELL

The Supreme Court once again visited the
entrapment doctrine in United States v. Russell.73 The
case involved a federal agent who helped the defendant
procure an essential ingredient for a methamphetamine
manufacturing operation and even assisted in the
process.74 Unlike in Sherman v. United States, the
defendant

expressly

requested

that

the

Court

reconsider the Sorrells and Sherman majorities’
entrapment test.75 The defendant also asked that the
Court find that the government’s participation in the
commission of the crime was at such a high level that
prosecuting the defendant for the crime would violate
the fundamental principles of due process. 76 Rather

Id. at 385.
See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 424-25 (1973).
74 Id. at 426.
75 Id. at 430.
76 Id.
72
73
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than reformulate the federal entrapment standard, the
majority went on to strengthen the legitimacy of the
subjective test for entrapment and reiterated the
importance of the defendant’s innocent predisposition
stating, “the principal element in the defense of
entrapment [is] the defendant’s predisposition to
commit the crime.” 77 The five-person majority also
refused to recognize the due process defense suggested
in the case before it 78. Still, it did hold that there was a
possibility that there may be a case someday in which
the conduct of a government agent is “so outrageous
that due process principles would absolutely bar the
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a
conviction.” 79 This defense has come to be known as the
outrageous government conduct defense. 80

Id. at 433.
Id. at 431-32.
79 Id.
80 See Francesca Laguardia, Terrorists, Informants, and Buffoons:
The Case for Downward Departure as a Response to Entrapment,
17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 171, 180 (2013).
77
78
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In dissent, Justice Stewart, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, argued that the Court should
adopt the objective test proposed by the Sorrells and
Sherman concurrences stating, “the question [should
be] whether -- regardless of the predisposition to crime
of

the

particular

defendant

involved

--

the

governmental agents have acted in such a way as is
likely to instigate or create a criminal offense.” 81 In
doing so, Justice Stewart reiterated many of the
arguments against the subjective test originally put
forth by the concurrence in Sherman.82 Namely, that in
deciding whether to invoke the entrapment defense, the
defendant is forced into a choice of evils and that the
introduction

of

evidence

about

the

defendant’s

reputation and prior acts subjects them to persecution
for things largely irrelevant to the crime charged.83
5.

HAMPTON V. UNITED STATES

United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 441 (1973).
Id. at 443.
83 Id.
81
82
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The entrapment defense was once again revisited

in Hampton v. United States.84 This case involved a
defendant who sold heroin to an undercover federal
agent which he claimed was supplied by another
undercover federal agent. 85 Despite the overwhelming
involvement of government officials in the commission
of the crime, the Court once again held there was no
entrapment under the subjective test. 86 The plurality
opinion, authored by Justice Rehnquist and joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice White, almost entirely
disregarded the issue of the government’s involvement
in the case and reiterated the importance of a
defendant’s innocent predisposition in relying on
entrapment.87 Justice Rehnquist even went so far as to
state that the Court had “ruled out the possibility that
the defense of entrapment could ever be based upon
governmental misconduct in a case [. . .] where the

See generally Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 485
(1976).
85 Id. at 486.
86 Id. at 490.
87 Id. at 488-89.
84
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predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime was
established.”88 The plurality also disregarded the
defendant’s

argument

that

the

conduct

of

the

government was of such a degree that due process
principles would be violated if the Court allowed the
government to invoke judicial processes to obtain a
conviction.89 In fact, the plurality went so far as to say
that a defense based on due process could not ever be
invoked and that the subjective test was the sole
remedy in cases involving entrapment.90
The concurring opinion agreed with Rehnquist’s
opinion as to the defendant’s inability to rely on
entrapment as a defense because of the existence of the
defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime. 91
However, the concurrence took issue with Rehnquist’s
foreclosure of due process grounds ever being a remedy

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 490.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 491-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
88
89
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for one in a case of entrapment.92 The concurrence wrote
that they were “unwilling to conclude that an analysis
other than one limited to predisposition would never be
appropriate under due process principles.” 93
As in Sherman v. United States, the dissent was
comprised of Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall,
which, again, opined that the Court should abandon the
subjective test in favor of the objective test for
entrapment.94 Additionally, the dissent agreed with the
concurrence’s opinion that the Court should not close
the door to possible future defenses in which the
conduct of government officials is so outrageous that to
allow a prosecution would violate due process. 95
Further, despite disagreeing with the Court’s use of the
subjective test for entrapment, the dissent argued that
the Court should nonetheless carve out an exception
under the test despite an individual’s predisposition

Id. at 492 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 493 (Powell, J., concurring).
94 Id. at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92
93

ENTRAPMENT

331

when “[t]he Government [does] nothing less than [buy]
contraband from itself through an intermediary and
[jails] the intermediary.” 96
6.

JACOBSON V. UNITED STATES

The most recent case from the Supreme Court
discussing the entrapment defense is Jacobson v.
United States.97 Perhaps signaling the preeminence of
the subjective test for entrapment in federal courts, the
defendant’s conduct was examined solely under the
subjective test by both the majority and the dissent.98
The case’s holding primarily concerned the defendant’s
predisposition to receive child pornography before the
government’s involvement.99 The majority opinion,
authored by Justice White, held that “the prosecution
must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant
was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first

Id. at 498. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See Gardbaum, supra note 42, at 1013.
98 See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
99 Id.
96
97
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being approached by Government agents.”100 Further,
the majority stated that a defendant’s criminal
predisposition is not established by having engaged in
an activity before it was made illegal. 101 This is because,
in the opinion of the majority, “there is a common
understanding that most people obey the law even
when they disapprove of it.” 102
The

dissent,

authored

by

Justice

O’Connor, took issue with the majority’s opinion of
when a defendant’s predisposition must be assessed.103
O’Connor opined that the predisposition assessment
should begin before the government agent first
suggested criminal conduct rather than from before
government agents ever approached the defendant.104
The dissent worried that imposing the majority’s new
requirement would unduly hamper the government’s
ability to conduct sting operations because “every

Id. at 548-49 (emphasis added).
Id. at 551.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 556 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
104 Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
100
101
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defendant will claim that something the Government
agent did before soliciting the crime ‘created’ a
predisposition that was not there before.”105
III.

THE CASE OF JAMES CROMITIE

Perhaps

the

most

infamous

terrorism

prosecution in recent history is that of James Cromitie.
Cromitie’s case drew the ire of numerous commentators
and legal academics due to the egregious behavior of
government actors during the investigation. The case of
James Cromitie is particularly relevant to the topic of
this paper because it highlights the investigatory
practices in federal terrorism cases, which are so
heavily criticized and highlights the ineffectiveness of
the federal entrapment defense in dissuading such
tactics.
Beginning in 2008, Shahed Hussain, a federal
informant, took part in the undercover terrorism

105

Id. at 557 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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investigation of James Cromitie.106 Hussain was a
Pakistani national who was granted asylum because of
supposed political persecution in Pakistan. 107 Hussain,
who had previously been convicted of fraud, agreed to
work

as

an

informant

for

the

FBI

to

avoid

deportation.108 Hussain worked as an informant in a
driver’s license fraud case, a heroin trafficking case, and
later, an infamous terrorism case against Mohammed
Hossain.109 In that case, Hussain was accused of
entrapment

and

was

found

exaggerated

and

fabricated

to
the

have
words

routinely
of

the

defendants.110

See United States v. Cromitie, 781 F. Supp. 2d 211, 215
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
107 See Andy Newman, Benjamin Weiser & William K. Rashbaum,
Limo Company Owner in Crash Revealed as F.B.I. Informant,
Recruiter of Terrorists, Fraudster, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 9,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/09/nyregion/limo-ownerfbi-informant-shahed-hussain.html.
108 See Graham Rayman, The Alarming Record of the F.B.I.’s
Informant in the Bronx Bomb Plot, THE VILLAGE VOICE (July 8,
2009), https://www.villagevoice.com/2009/07/08/the-alarmingrecord-of-the-f-b-i-s-informant-in-the-bronx-bomb-plot/.
109 Id.
110 Id.
106
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Later, the FBI directed Hussain to attend
services at a mosque in Newburgh with the stated goal
of locating “disaffected Muslims who might be
harboring terrorist designs on the United States.”111 To
assist in his mission, Hussain was provided with a
residence, referred to as the Shipp Street house, which
was wired to make video and audio recordings of the
living room.112 Hussain presented himself at the
mosque as a wealthy Pakistani businessman named
Maqsood and frequently spoke of jihad and violence. 113
On June 13, 2008, James Cromitie, who made
less than $14,000 per year working at Walmart and
supplemented his income making petty drug deals,
approached Hussain in the

Newburgh mosque’s

parking lot.114 In an unrecorded conversation, Cromitie

United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 201-02 (2d Cir. 2013).
See United States v. Cromitie, 781 F. Supp. 2d 211, 215
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).; Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 200.
113 See Paul Goldenberg, Newburgh Mosque Leaders: We Don’t
Preach Hate, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY (May 25, 2009, 11:42
PM), https://www.jta.org/2009/05/25/united-states/newburghmosque-leaders-we-dont-preach-hate.
114 Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 200.
111
112
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told Hussain about himself and his family in which he
falsely claimed that his father was from Afghanistan.115
In addition, Cromitie, allegedly, told Hussain that he
would be interested in traveling to Afghanistan and
falsely stated that he had previously made three trips
to Afghanistan on his own.116 Most significantly,
Cromitie allegedly told Hussain of his desire to die as a
martyr and “do something to America.”117
On June 23, 2008, Hussain and Cromitie met at
the Shipp Street house; however, the meeting was not
recorded.118 According to Hussain, Cromitie told him of
his hatred for Jews and expressed a desire to shoot
President Bush 700 times.119 Cromitie also told Hussain
more about his family and his fictional criminal past.120
Cromitie allegedly told Hussain that he had killed a
rival drug dealer’s son and had spent 15 years in prison

Cromitie, 781 F. Supp. 2d at 215.
Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 216.
115
116
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for the crime.121 When Hussain asked what Cromitie
planned to do with his life, Cromitie responded that he
was trying to straighten himself out and, as a result,
was working harder at his job and trying to be a more
devout Muslim.122
On July 3, 2008, Hussain and Cromitie again met
at the Shipp Street house, and again, the meeting was
not recorded.123 During this meeting, Hussain told
Cromitie that he was an agent for a Pakistani terror
group who was to recruit members to carry out a terror
attack in America.124 According to Hussain, Cromitie
told him he had no issue with jihad and would be
interested in participating.125
After

the

July

third

meeting,

without

establishing the veracity of Cromitie’s claims of Afghani
parentage, trips to Afghanistan, or violent criminal

Id.
Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
121
122
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history, the FBI decided to open an investigation into
James Cromitie.126 As a result of this formal recognition
of the investigation into James Cromitie, Hussain
recorded his future meetings with Cromitie.127
On October 12, 2008, Hussain met with Cromitie
in Suffern, New York.128 While making anti-Semitic
remarks of his own, Hussain successfully elicited
similar opinions from Cromitie. 129 However, while
discussing reports of non-believers killing Muslims in
Pakistan, Hussain told Cromitie that the Quran
requires Muslims to commit violence against infidels.130
In response, Cromitie, curiously less zealous than in
earlier conversations, stated that he did not believe
further

violence

Muslims.131

would

Cromitie

solve

responded

violence
similarly

against
when

Hussain stated that he believed an attack on the

Id.
Id. at 216-17.
128 Id. at 217.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
126
127
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Marriot Hotel in Pakistan would guarantee a Muslim a
place in Paradise.132
Cromitie met with Hussain again on October
19.133 In response to Cromitie’s complaints of being
mistreated by Jews, Hussain stated that, according to
Mohammed, Jews were to be eliminated because they
are the source of all evil in the world. 134 Cromitie
expressed ambivalence towards Hussain’s remarks.135
When Hussain asked whether Cromitie would be
interested in traveling to Afghanistan, Cromitie told
Hussain that he was uninterested in traveling to a wartorn country.136
In the following two months, Cromitie continued
to express anti-Semitic views to Hussain in their
meetings.137 However, when pressed by Hussain to act

Id.
Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 217-18.
132
133
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on his views by selecting a target for a terror attack,
recruiting others to commit a terror attack, or
purchasing weapons, Cromitie refused. 138 Hussain
continued in his attempts to induce Cromitie by offering
him money and even by offering Cromitie his BMW, but
Cromitie repeatedly refused these offers.139
In December of 2008, Hussain left the country for
two months on an extended trip to Pakistan and
London.140 During Hussain’s absence, the investigating
agent met with officials from Stewart Airport, a possible
target

mentioned

in

Hussain

and

Cromitie’s

conversations.141 In assuring the officials of Stewart
Airport’s safety, the agent stated that he believed
Cromitie was unlikely to commit a terror attack without
the support of an FBI source.142 When Hussain returned
from his extended trip, Cromitie informed him that he
had taken no steps towards the commission of a terror

Id. at 218.
Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
138
139
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attack.143 In subsequent meetings with Cromitie,
Hussain continued to offer Cromitie financial incentives
to carry out a terror attack and offered additional
payments if Cromitie recruited others to participate in
the plot.144 On February 23, 2009, after an offer of
$250,000, Cromitie finally assented to participating in
a terror plot on Stewart Airport.145
However, despite having seemingly agreed to
participate in a terror attack, Cromitie avoided seeing
or even speaking to Hussain for six weeks following a
surveillance drive around Stewart Airport on February
24.146 The investigating agent encouraged Hussain to
call Cromitie several times, but Cromitie failed to
answer Hussain’s calls.147 This lack of communication

Id.
Id. at 219.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 220.
143
144
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with Cromitie led the FBI to conclude that the
investigation had reached its end. 148
It was not until April 5, 2009, when Cromitie had
lost his job at Walmart and had become exceedingly
desperate for money, that he reached out to Hussain.149
Cromitie agreed to go forward with participating in a
terror

attack

for

money

but,

suggesting

some

reluctance, insisted that he did not want to martyr
himself.150

Nevertheless,

Cromitie

and

Hussain

ultimately formulated a plan to bomb the Riverdale
Temple, a synagogue in the Bronx.151
Cromitie convinced three other men to join the
plot in the following weeks: David Williams, Onta
Williams, and Laguerre Payen.152 Federal agents built
fake bombs and a fake stinger missile which the
conspirators had to drive to Connecticut to collect.153
Id.
Id.
150 Id.
151 See United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 202 (2d Cir.
2013).
152 See Cromitie, 781 F. Supp. 2d at 220.
153 Id.
148
149
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Following

the

receipt

of

their

“ordinance,”

the

conspirators decided that their planned attack on the
Riverdale Temple would occur on May 20, 2009.154
When the group arrived at the synagogue, Cromitie
planted the fake bombs while David Williams, Onta
Williams, and Laguerre Payen watched out.155 When
Cromitie finished, the four men returned to Hussain’s
car and were subsequently arrested by hundreds of law
enforcement agents.156
At trial, Cromitie alleged that Hussain had
entrapped him.157 When Hussain testified at trial, his
stories frequently contained inconsistencies, and he
regularly contradicted stories he had told only a day
prior.158 In fact, Hussain’s lies were so obvious that
jurors rolled their eyes when he spoke while journalists

Id.
Id.
156 Id.
157 See United States v. Cromitie, 09 Cr. 558 (CM), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 48201, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2011).
158 See Laguardia, supra note 80, at 196.
154
155
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seated in the courtroom laughed to themselves.159
However, the jury also heard the recordings of
Cromitie’s virulently antisemitic statements. 160 The
jury ultimately found Cromitie guilty of conspiring to
commit a terror attack.161 When interviewed following
trial, three jurors stated that they would never have
voted not guilty, seemingly due to a misunderstanding
of predisposition.162
Cromitie appealed the judgment and sought to
have the jury’s rejection of his entrapment defense
overturned.163 Despite noting Cromitie’s reluctance to
participate in the attack and his perilous financial
circumstances immediately prior to participation in the
plot, the District Court ruled that Cromitie had failed
to produce such overwhelming evidence that no

Id.
See Cromitie, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48201, at *12.
161 Id. at *2.
162 See Phil Hirschkorn, The Newburgh Sting, HUFFPOST (June
29, 2014, 4:01 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/thenewburgh-sting_b_5234822 (explaining how jurors believed that
Cromitie was not entrapped based solely on his ultimate
participation in the plot).
163 See Cromitie, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48201, at *2.
159
160
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reasonable jury could possibly find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.164 Similarly, the District Court
rejected Cromitie’s arguments that the Court should
dismiss the case on the basis of outrageous government
conduct.165
Cromitie appealed to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, realleging entrapment as a matter of law and
outrageous government conduct.166 As to Cromitie’s
allegation of entrapment as a matter of law, the Court
of Appeals echoed the sentiment of the District Court.167
Although noting holes in Hussain’s narrative and
Cromitie’s inability to carry out a terror attack without
federal assistance, the Court held Cromitie had failed
to overcome the lofty burden of reversing a jury’s
verdict.168 Additionally, the Court rejected Cromitie’s

Id. at *25.
See United States v. Cromitie, 781 F. Supp. 2d 211, 227
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
166 See United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 199 (2d Cir.
2013).
167 Id. at 215.
168 Id.
164
165
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argument that the verdict should be reversed on due
process grounds and affirmed the District Court’s
ruling.169
a. RESOLVING THE ISSUES SURROUNDING
FEDERAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS
THROUGH STATUTORY ADOPTION OF THE
OBJECTIVE TEST
Given the tactics utilized by the government in
investigating terror suspects, entrapment is a natural
defense for defendants to assert. However, since the
9/11 terror attacks, not a single terrorism defendant has
successfully utilized entrapment as a defense.170 This
complete lack of success, even in egregious cases such
as Cromitie’s, can largely be attributed to the
weaknesses of the subjective test for entrapment.
One such weakness of the subjective entrapment
standard is that it does not adequately dissuade
government actors from utilizing questionable tactics.
Under the subjective test, the behavior of government

169
170

Id. at 219-21.
See Norris & Grol-Prokopczyk, supra note 25, at 612-13.
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actors is completely disregarded so long as the
defendant’s

predisposition

is

established.171

The

dismissal of charges based on the government’s conduct
is instead left to the “outrageous government conduct”
defense

established

in

Russell.172

However,

the

outrageous government conduct defense is also largely
ineffective at dissuading unscrupulous investigation
tactics as convictions are frequently upheld despite
government

conduct

which,

on

its

face,

seems

outrageous.173 As such, under the subjective test,
federal terrorism investigators are largely free to utilize
whatever tactic they please so long as predisposition is
established.

See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973).
Id. at 431-32.
173 See United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 221 (2d Cir. 2013)
(rejecting outrageous government conduct defense where
impoverished defendant was repeatedly offered money to
participate in a terror attack); see also United States v. Schmidt,
105 F.3d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting outrageous government
conduct defense to attempted murder charge where federal agents
staged a woman’s escape from a prison’s mental unit and posed as
hired hitmen who had killed the guards); see also United States v.
Black, 733 F.3d 294, 310 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting outrageous
government conduct defense where informant solicited people in a
low-income area at random to participate in the robbery of a fake
stash house).
171
172
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Another

such

weakness

of

the

subjective

entrapment standard is the permissive nature by which
it allows the admission of evidence that is likely to
unduly prejudice defendants. As noted by Justice
Roberts in Sorrells, the subjective entrapment standard
allows for evidence of a defendant’s prior acts or
reputation to be introduced by the prosecution to
establish the defendant’s criminal predisposition.174
The introduction of such evidence is typically barred by
the Federal Rules of Evidence specifically because of its
tendency to prejudice defendants.175 Such evidence is
significantly damaging in terrorism cases because
defendants are frequently mentally ill or proponents of
fringe political or religious beliefs, which easily
establish the defendant’s disposition towards terrorism
for a jury of ordinary citizens.176

See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932)
(Roberts, J., concurring).
175 See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note.
176 See Norris & Grol-Prokopczyk, supra note 25, at 625, 647, 653.
174
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Another

weakness

of

the

subjective

entrapment standard is that juries have difficulties
properly applying entrapment as a defense, especially
in

terror

cases.

Jurors,

plagued

by

anxieties

surrounding terrorism, have difficulties determining
that defendants were entrapped, even in cases where
government conduct is egregious. 177 In addition, juries
are generally unable to look past the catastrophic
damage that would have resulted if the defendant had
successfully committed a terror attack.178 For example,
in the case of Hamir Hayat, a particularly notorious
terrorism case, only one of the jurors apparently
believed that Hayat would have actually carried out a
terror attack.179 Despite this seemingly establishing
Hayat’s lack of predisposition, he was not acquitted of
his charges.180 After the trial, one juror admitted that

Id. at 625.
See Laguardia, supra note 80, at 174.
179 See Amy Waldman, Prophetic Justice, THE ATLANTIC (Oct.
2006),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/10/propheticjustice/305234/.
180 Id.
177
178
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she believed Hayat had been entrapped but felt too
intimidated by the other jurors to vote for acquittal.181
In response to the failures of the subjective test,
an overwhelming number of legal commentators have
proposed replacing it with the objective test proposed by
Justice Roberts, Frankfurter, and Stewart. 182 Among
the proponents of the objective test is the American Law
Institute, codifying it in the Model Penal Code as
follows:
(1)
A public law enforcement official or a
person acting in co-operation with such an official
perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of
obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he
induces or encourages another person to engage in
conduct constituting such offense by either:
(a)
making
knowingly
false
representations designed to induce the belief that such
conduct is not prohibited; or
(b)
employing methods of persuasion or
inducement that create a substantial risk that such an
offense will be committed by persons other than those
who are ready to commit it.
(2)
Except as provided in Subsection (3) of this
Section, a person prosecuted for an offense shall be
acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence
that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment.
Id.
See Damon D. Camp, Out of the Quagmire After Jacobson v.
United States: Towards a More Balanced Entrapment Standard,
83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1055, 1069 (1993).
181
182
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The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the Court in
the absence of the jury.
(3)
The defense afforded by this Section is
unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury
is an element of the offense charged, and the
prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening
such injury to a person other than the person
perpetrating the entrapment.183
Several states have acted upon this preference
and have adopted the objective test by both supreme
court decision and statute.184
The objective test differs from the subjective test
primarily in that it does not consider a particular
defendant’s predisposition but rather whether the
government’s conduct created a substantial risk that an
ordinary person would commit the given crime.185 The
defendant typically must make this showing by a
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (AM. L. INST. 1962).
ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.450 (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702237 (2021); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (2021); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 313 (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. §76-2-303 (2021); State v.
Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375, 382 (Iowa 1974); People v. Turner, 210
N.W.2d 336, 342 (Mich. 1973); State v. Wilkins, 473 A.2d 295, 299
(Vt. 1983).
185 State v. Yi, 85 P.3d 469, 472 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004); State v.
Anderson, 572 P.2d 159, 162 (Haw. 1977); Commonwealth v.
Zingarelli, 839 A.2d 1064, 1073 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); State v.
Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 318 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Wilkins,
473 A.2d at 299; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 explanatory note (AM.
L. INST. 1962).
183
184
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preponderance of the evidence.186 This change would
likely help solve some of the major problems with
federal terrorism investigations that exist partially due
to the subjective test’s focus on the defendant’s
predisposition. Because a defendant’s predisposition is
not considered in determining whether they were
entrapped under the objective test, the government
would be less free to admit the prejudicial evidence they
frequently rely on in establishing predisposition.
Consequently, determinations of whether a defendant
accused of terrorism was entrapped would be less likely
to turn on their political views, religious views, or
overall mental stability, and instead, would be decided
based

on

the

government’s

actions

during

the

investigation.
The

government

is

also

unlikely

to

be

significantly handicapped by this shift to the objective

18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 313 (2022); State v. Yi, 85 P.3d at 472;
State v. Nakamura, 648 P.2d 183, 186 (Haw. 1982); State v.
Wilkins, 473 A.2d at 299; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 explanatory
note (AM. L. INST. 1962).
186
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test, especially in terrorism cases. The objective test
focuses on how an ordinary person would respond to the
government’s conduct.187 As such, because of the
incredibly violent nature of terror attacks, the
government’s

conduct

would

likely

have

to

be

particularly appalling for a court to conclude that it
created a substantial risk that an ordinary person
would engage in a terror attack and the government
would be free to make arguments to this effect.
Consequently, the objective test would likely only
inhibit

those

particularly

investigatory

problematic

and

tactics
would

which

are

leave

the

government’s ability to prevent terror attacks largely
unconstrained.

ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.450 (2021) (“[I]t is an affirmative defense
that [. . .] a public law enforcement official or a person working in
cooperation with the official induced the defendant to commit the
offense by persuasion or inducement as would be effective to
persuade an average person [. . .] to commit the offense) (emphasis
added); State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366, 368 (Utah 1980) (“[T]he
objective test does not prohibit the police from affording a person
an opportunity to commit crime; it only prohibits active
inducements on the part of the government for the purpose of
luring an ‘average’ person into the commission of an offense.”).
187
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The Model Penal Code and some states’

formulation of the objective test also hold that the issue
of entrapment is decided by the judge rather than by a
jury.188 This change is especially relevant in terrorism
cases because, as previously discussed, juries largely
have difficulty properly deciding that a terrorism
defendant was entrapped because of the inflammatory
nature of the crime they are accused of committing.189
In contrast, judges are generally much less likely to be
influenced by the emotional nature of a case and are
more concerned with the technical details of the law.190
As a result, terrorism defendants would be less likely to
have their claim of entrapment rejected based purely on
the provocative nature of the crime they are accused of

UTAH CODE ANN. §76-2-303 (2021) (“Upon written motion of
the defendant, the court shall hear evidence on the issue and
shall determine as a matter of fact and law whether the
defendant was entrapped to commit the offense.”); McLaughlin v.
State, 737 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (“Entrapment
is an issue for the court, not the jury.”); MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.13 explanatory note (AM. L. INST. 1962) (“[Subsection (2)
provides] that the issue [of entrapment] is to be tried to the court
and not the jury.”).
189 Norris & Grol-Prokopczyk, supra note 25, at 625.
190 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE
ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES 32 (2008).
188
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committing and instead have it decided based on the
merits of the case.
When applied to the case of James Cromitie,
these changes make it much more likely that the
government’s conduct would have resulted in a finding
of entrapment. During the government’s investigation,
Hussain cultivated a close friendship with Cromitie
during which he consistently attempted to alter
Cromitie’s religious views into a more radical form of
Islam.191 Hussain repeatedly pressured Cromitie to
participate in a terror plot over the course of several
months, and even offered to pay Cromitie considerable
amounts of money in exchange for his participation in
the terror plot at a time when he was particularly
destitute.192 These facts, when taken together, almost
certainly created a substantial risk that Cromitie would
participate in the terror plot. Additionally, because the

United States v. Cromitie, 781 F. Supp. 2d 211, 217-221
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
192 Id.
191
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objective test does not consider the defendant’s
predisposition, the government would likely have been
less able to admit the recordings of Cromitie’s antiSemitic rants and evidence of his prior criminal history
which undoubtedly damaged his chances of acquittal at
trial. Furthermore, the determination of whether
Cromitie was entrapped would have been left with the
District Court Judge, who was seemingly able to apply
the law contrary to her own feelings about the case,
rather than with jurors who stated that they would
never have voted to acquit Cromitie due to their
apparent misunderstanding of predisposition.193
Given this new likelihood that their tactics may
result in acquittals on the basis of entrapment, federal
investigators would have a reason to change the
manner in which they conduct terrorism investigations.
The government could improve its investigations by

United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 216 (2d Cir. 2013)
(noting that the District Court Judge ruled against Cromitie in
spite of her statement that, “It is beyond question that the
Government created the crime here”); Hirschkorn, supra note
164.
193

357
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implementing any number of changes, such as leaving
the creation of concrete plans to the suspect,
discontinuing

investigations

when

suspects

like

Cromitie voice disinterest in participating in a terror
plot, more thoroughly vetting informants so that the
brunt of the investigation is not left to habitual liars like
Hussain, utilizing more audio-visual recording devices
so that agents are not relying solely on the accounts of
their informants, or by encouraging federal agents to
consult with prosecuting attorneys more frequently so
that they are more aware of when their investigations
are crossing the line into entrapment. In fact, these
changes would be wise even absent some change in the
federal entrapment standard.
It currently seems unlikely that the Supreme
Court will replace the subjective test for entrapment.194
As Justice Brennan, a vocal proponent of the objective
test, stated in Mathews v. United States:

194

See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 67 (1988).
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Were I judging on a clean slate, I would still be
inclined to adopt the view that the entrapment defense
should focus exclusively on the government's conduct.
But I am not writing on a clean slate; the Court has
spoken definitively on this point. Therefore I bow to
stare decisis[.]195
Despite

the

Supreme

Court’s

apparent

reluctance to adopt the objective test, the legislature
may decide to change the standard on its own.196 In
United States v. Russell, Justice Rehnquist stated,
“Since

[entrapment]

is

not

of

a

constitutional

dimension, Congress may address itself to the question
and adopt any substantive definition of the defense that
it may find desirable.”197 As such, given criticism of
federal tactics of federal investigatory tactics by
legislators both conservative and liberal,198 statutory

Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973).
197 Id.
198 Carly Roman, Gaetz Asks About Role of ‘Federal Undercover
Agents’ in Capitol Riot, THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER,
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/gaetz-asks-rolefederal-undercover-agents-capitol-riot (updated June 16, 2021,
3:52PM); Noa Yachot, Fears Grow That Efforts to Combat US
Domestic Terrorism Can Hurt Minorities, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 26,
2021, 04:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2021/jan/26/push-combat-us-domestic-terrorism-far-rightextremism.
195
196
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adoption of parts (1) and (2) of the Model Penal Code’s
formulation of the objective test is a natural and logical
solution.
IV.
In

CONCLUSION
conclusion,

encouragement

from

the

level

federal

of

control

and

agents

and

their

informants present in the investigation of the plot to
kidnap Michigan’s Governor is very common in
terrorism investigations. Although the government’s
level of involvement in this case resembles entrapment,
the defendants are very unlikely to successfully assert
entrapment as a defense. This is because the subjective
test

for entrapment’s focus on the

defendant’s

predisposition and reliance on jurors will likely spell
doom for the defendants’ chances of acquittal, especially
given their prior radical political beliefs, potential prior
unrelated criminal charges, and the heinous nature of
their plot. As argued in this paper, adoption of the
objective test for entrapment, as codified by the Model
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Penal Code, would help alleviate many of these
problems because its focus on the government’s conduct
and its entrustment of the entrapment determination to
judges, more neutral decision makers, increases the
likelihood that such a high level of government
encouragement or control would result in the dismissal
of the defendants’ charges. As a result, federal
investigators would be encouraged to revise their
playbook and focus their efforts on organic terror plots
that may threaten the nation rather than plots of their
own creation.

